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ESCALATION AT SEA
Stability and Instability in Maritime East Asia
Ian Bowers
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n recent years, the seas of East Asia have witnessed frequent clashes among na-
val, coast guard, and paramilitary vessels and civilian actors� This has created 
academic and policy concerns regarding the potential for significant escalation 
in the region� This article argues that low-level instability is to be expected with 
maritime boundary disputes or when power competition occurs at sea; howev-
er, sustained escalatory cycles are unlikely, because of the characteristics of the 
maritime strategic environment� The maritime theater possesses unique strategic 
characteristics� These include the nature of potential strategic threats, the speed 
of response, and quick attribution of responsibility� These characteristics reduce 
the potential for escalation and allow de-escalatory strategies to achieve greater 
success� These findings demonstrate that the maritime sphere in East Asia is 
more stable than is commonly thought�
In East Asian waters, disputes over the sovereign control of islands, the extent 
and delimitation of maritime jurisdictional boundaries, and the operational 
rights and obligations of military vessels in jurisdictional waters coexist with 
conflicting nationalist narratives and fears of great-power competition�1 China’s 
growing presence and actions in this strategic maritime arena are upending 
the post–World War II status quo and shifting the power dynamics that have 
maintained stability in the region� This, in com-
bination with political and strategic uncertainty 
arising from the election of Donald Trump to the 
American presidency, has led to increasing fears 
about conflict escalation at sea�2 Such instability is 
manifested in fractious interactions among grow-
ing naval (indigenous and external), civil maritime 
I
Autumn2018Review.indb   45 8/6/18   8:49 AM
1
Bowers: Escalation at Sea: Stability and Instability in Maritime East Asi
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2018
 4 6  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
law-enforcement, and civilian actors who aim to assert or contest perceived eco-
nomic and navigation rights at sea� Reflecting this reality, in 2016 the commander 
of U�S� Pacific Command, Admiral Harry B� Harris, stated that the region was 
“ripe for miscalculation that could escalate to conflicts that no one wants, in an 
area vital to global prosperity�”3
On the surface, given the publicity that clashes at sea garner, such a fear may 
seem well-founded�4 Numerous studies have revealed the propensity for con-
flict escalation over the issue of sovereign control of land, including disputed 
islands�5 However, the potential for escalation arising from incidents at sea and 
the strategic effect of such incidents remain largely understudied phenomena�6 
By focusing solely on incidents at sea, this article argues that in areas of contested 
maritime jurisdictional claims or maritime zones in which strategic competitors 
meet, peaceful interactions among military, law-enforcement, and civilian actors 
should not be expected� However, accidental, inadvertent, or even intentional 
acts that result in clashes between rival forces should not trigger sustained es-
calatory cycles or be construed as a prelude to major conflict at sea or on land� 
Rather, such events should be viewed as an expected consequence of operations 
in contested maritime environments� In short, at sea, the threshold for stability 
in contested areas is low, and therefore escalatory incidents are likely; however, 
escalatory cycles or sustained conflict, including war at sea, are unlikely to follow 
such incidents�
To justify this contention, this article argues that a maritime strategic envi-
ronment imposes specific conditions on escalatory and triggering dynamics� 
Disputed maritime borders, unlike those on land, cannot be held, and thus must 
be contested� Despite this requirement of contestation and the impossibility of 
exercising total control, conflicts at sea typically do not present an existential 
strategic threat to the involved parties� Escalation arising from inadvertence or 
miscalculation is easier to control, owing to the realities of operating in a mari-
time environment�7 At an operational level, it is easier to achieve controlled de-
escalation at sea than on land� The options to use new weapons systems or attack 
new types of targets (vertical escalation) are limited, and geographic expansion 
of the area of conflict (horizontal escalation) is unlikely�8
The article develops this argument by discussing how the nature of the mari-
time strategic environment simultaneously can sustain low-level instability yet 
dampen escalatory pressures� It supports these ideas by examining U�S�-USSR 
maritime interactions during the Cold War and by analyzing incidents at sea that 
have arisen from disputed maritime boundaries across the globe since the Cold 
War� The article finishes by using these findings to consider the implications for 
our understanding of how stability and instability in maritime East Asia manifest 
themselves�
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CONTESTED SEAS, STABLE INSTABILITY, AND WAR
Maritime geography enhances the potential for instability at sea, since it allows 
actors in competition or in conflict to interact to a greater extent than is possible 
on land�9 This section argues that this instability should be expected unless mari-
time boundaries are agreed to or strategic competition is rendered inert� Further, 
it shows that, despite this instability, sustained vertical or horizontal escalation 
past any initial incident is unlikely�
Disputed Maritime Rights
In the case of contested territory or strategic competition on land, the role of a 
state’s armed forces is to defend demarcated borders or to seize and hold enemy 
territory�10 Control of territory brings about the capacity to govern both the land 
and the people and to use both for economic advantage� It is only during times of 
war that borders dissolve, the armed forces of competing states interact, and the 
control of territory becomes uncertain�
At sea, the type of control that allows for the maintenance of land borders is 
not possible� Except for areas close to shore, the sea is controlled permanently by 
no one� Sovereign boundaries—such as those delineating territorial waters, con-
tiguous zones, and exclusive economic zones (EEZs), as defined under the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)—are not demarcated by 
the permanent presence of navies or civilian agencies; rather, they are maintained 
by political agreements on land�
If a party chooses to ignore UNCLOS or parties have differing interpretations 
of its parameters and the obligations it imposes, the possibility for clashes is 
heightened, since in contested areas at sea any exercise of administrative control 
is fluid and limited�11 If one power vacates an area of the sea, control does not 
transfer automatically to another party; rather, it is left vacant�12 Parties who pos-
sess the requisite naval or maritime capacity easily can enter disputed waters to 
contest control or undertake resource-exploitation activities�
To maintain legitimacy in contested waters, states are required to undertake 
operations to assert and defend their perceived rights� This can take the form 
of sailing through disputed waters, exploiting maritime zones for economic 
purposes, or performing law-enforcement and naval operations consistent with 
sovereign control� Absent an intervening authority such as the United Nations, 
political agreement on land, or compatible interpretations of the UNCLOS 
regime, this can create substantial friction, leading to clashes among military 
vessels, other state-controlled vessels, and civilian vessels such as fishing boats�
This friction has been illustrated in a number of clashes between democratic 
countries over maritime economic exploitation rights� The “Lobster War” be-
tween Brazil and France in early 1963, the “Cod Wars” between Iceland and the 
United Kingdom in the mid-1970s, and the Canadian-Spanish “Turbot War” in 
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1995–96 all saw democratic countries deploying military force to assert their 
perceived maritime economic rights against other democracies� Similarly, a 
2006 incident between South Korea and Japan over exploration in a potentially 
lucrative fishing zone surrounding the disputed Dokdo/Takeshima Islands saw 
military and maritime law-enforcement assets being deployed to assert both 
countries’ claims�13
This type of deployment of military and civilian maritime law-enforcement 
actors to contested maritime zones has not yet resulted in substantial levels of 
escalation� The three earliest cases described above each ended with a political 
solution, while the fourth, between South Korea and Japan, has resulted in sus-
tained but low-level instability characterized by the periodic dispatch of military 
and civilian law-enforcement assets to indicate the respective country’s claims�
As represented in table 1, data extracted from the Dispute Narratives of the 
Military Interstate Dispute dataset provide further evidence of sustained low-
level instability at sea� However, in no case did this instability evolve into war; 
indeed, no substantial escalation occurred past the initial clash�14 These data 
indicate that instability and clashes are to be expected in contested maritime 
environments, but substantial escalation, including to the point of interstate war 
breaking out, is unlikely�
TABLE 1
DISPUTE NARRATIVES, 1993–2010: GLOBAL MILITARIZED INTERSTATE  
DISPUTES AT SEA
Total Number of Cases 
561
Cases at Sea 
116
Frequency
No. (%)Source of Dispute
Level of Force Used
Use of Force Display of Force Threat to Use Force
Activities in  
disputed waters
50 (43�1) 30 18 2
Illegal fishing 
operations
 20 (17�2)  19  1 0
Operations around 
disputed islands
 13 (11�2)  2 11 0
Strategic and  
security operations
 18 (15�6)  3 13 2
Other  15 (12�9)  10  5 0
Total number of 
disputes
 116  64 (55�2%)  48 (41�4%)  4 (3�4%)
Sources: Data from “Dispute Narratives, 1993–2001, Correlates of War Project MIDv.4.0, 13 December 2013” and “Dispute Narratives 2002–2010, 
Correlates of War Project MIDv4.0, 13 December 2013,” both in Glenn Palmer et al., “The MID4 Dataset, 2002–2010: Procedures, Coding Rules and 
Description,” Conflict Management and Peace Science 32, no. 2 (2015). (The table does not include data for the Korean Peninsula; see below.)
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Notably, operations in waters with disputed maritime boundaries accounted 
for over 40 percent of the interstate disputes at sea� These were caused primar-
ily by resource-exploitation operations, including fishing and oil exploration� 
In several cases—notably in the Gulf of Fonseca, on the Pacific coast of Central 
America—multiple interactions took place within short periods, but there is no 
evidence that any escalation in the level or mode of violence occurred� In a num-
ber of theaters, including the South and East China Seas, economic and strategic 
operations in disputed waters resulted in the consistent display and use of force 
to enforce perceived maritime rights, yet again no further escalation occurred�
Power Competition at Sea
Disputed maritime borders are not the only source of conflict at sea� Power com-
petition there is manifested in a different manner than on land� The sea is a global 
commons with free access for all�15 Consequently, geographically distant but still 
adversarial powers can operate in closer proximity and with greater freedom 
than they would on land in areas of mutual strategic interest, thereby heightening 
the risk of interstate clashes� This risk can be exacerbated further in that under 
UNCLOS littoral states cannot restrict innocent passage through territorial 
waters�16 Naval forces therefore legally can pass through the maritime territory 
of a competing state� Further, differing legal interpretations of the necessity for 
notification of innocent passage and the operating rights of military vessels in 
the EEZ can lead to conflict, because littoral states may seek to limit the ability of 
others to enjoy the navigation and operating freedoms commonly understood to 
be granted under UNCLOS�17
During the Cold War, the sea was a marginal strategic arena when compared 
with the NATO-USSR divide that dominated continental Europe� While the 
opposing land forces did not engage each other directly during this period, 
their navies often operated in proximity, both in important geostrategic areas 
such as the waters of northern Europe and the Mediterranean and in their 
respective littoral zones� This resulted in numerous distinct acts of extremely 
dangerous behavior� As table 2 shows, over the thirty-five-year period between 
1950 and 1984, there were 422 acts between U�S� and Soviet naval and state- 
controlled vessels and aircraft that at least one side described as exceeding peace-
ful operations�18
Such incidents included the harassment of vessels during normal operations, 
dangerous maneuvers such as crossing and shouldering, and the pointing of 
weapons and use of fire-control radars to track opposing ships and aircraft� 
Pointing was considered particularly hazardous, as it blurred the line between 
peacetime harassment and preparation for attack�19
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Despite these multiple acts, war did not break out; rather, low-level instabil-
ity persisted without resulting in a sustained escalatory cycle or the substantial 
heightening of political tensions between the parties�
Instability at Sea and the Transition to War
It is important to emphasize that in cases of both disputes over maritime bound-
aries and power competition at sea, despite clashes involving varying levels of 
force and lethality, there is no evidence that significant escalation followed any 
incident� Indeed, there is little historical evidence that clashes at sea are a primary 
reason for the occurrence of interstate conflict, either at sea or on land� In other 
words, war is unlikely to break out as the sole result of clashes on the water� In 
modern history, the British-Spanish War of Jenkins’s Ear between 1739 and 1748 
is a notable exception� Conflicts such as the War of 1812, the First Sino-Japanese 
War (1894–95), and the Pacific theater in World War II had substantial maritime 
components, yet the wars at sea were secondary to the broader strategic, political, 
and economic issues at stake on land�20
To understand why, we must return to the relationship between the sea and 
the land� As the highly regarded British naval theorist Sir Julian Corbett noted 
when discussing naval warfare, “Since men live upon the land and not upon the 
sea, great issues between nations at war have always been decided—except in the 
rarest cases—either by what your army can do against your enemy’s territory and 
national life or else by the fear of what the fleet makes it possible for your army 
to do�”21 In other words, what happens on the sea can be understood only in the 
context of its relationship with the land and the material effect such events have 
on populations�
Acts at sea rarely have an immediate influence on a state’s survival or the living 
conditions of the populace� They often occur far from the public eye and evoke 
less emotional responses�22 Therefore the escalatory pressure on decision makers 
is reduced, so low–level or tactical interactions at sea generally do not have an 
impact on the broader strategic picture� Consequently, the Cold War’s numer-
ous and severe incidents at sea between the two superpowers did not result in 
Total Number 422
Type of Incident
Dangerous 
Maneuvers Harassment Pointing/Tracking Collision/Shouldering Loss of Life Other
135 130 109 17 1 30
TABLE 2
REPORTED INCIDENTS AT SEA BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND USSR: 1950–84
Source: Data taken from Winkler, Cold War at Sea, pp. 177–210.
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escalation� Such events did not impact strategic stability and were not important 
enough to warrant a response that could trigger conflict in the core theater of 
continental Europe or risk the possibility of nuclear war� The high strategic stakes 
of the Cold War ensured that even serious clashes at sea, much like higher-profile 
incidents such as the Cuban missile crisis, were contained, since the leadership of 
neither side desired a mutually catastrophic conflict�23
The Korean Peninsula provides ample further evidence of these dynamics� Be-
tween 1954 and 2010 there were 510 cases of what the South Korean Ministry of 
National Defense classifies as local provocations at sea�24 These include 490 cases 
of North Korean–flagged naval and civilian vessels crossing into South Korean 
waters and twenty cases of naval engagements�25 Since 1999, there have been sev-
eral high-profile incidents near the contested Northern Limit Line (NLL) on the 
west coast of the peninsula� These include three battles at sea: the first and second 
battles of Yeonpyeong (1999 and 2002) and the battle of Daecheong (2009)� The 
sinking of ROKS Cheonan in 2010 cost the lives of forty-six South Korean naval 
personnel but did not result in escalatory actions either at sea or on the Korean 
Peninsula itself� These incidents, while costly in terms of lives and equipment, did 
not warrant the risk of starting an escalatory cycle that could impact the broader 
strategic balance on the peninsula, and by extension the physical and economic 
well-being of South Korea�26
Similarly, the capture of the intelligence-gathering ship USS Pueblo in 1968 
by North Korean forces resulted in substantial pressure on the Johnson admin-
istration to escalate in response to Pyongyang’s actions� While the United States 
did deploy extra naval assets to the region as a show of force, there was a clear 
preference on the part of the U�S� government to find a negotiated solution� As 
Clark Clifford, a U�S� presidential adviser, stated, a spy ship was not worth going 
to war over�27
FACTORS THAT FURTHER INHIBIT ESCALATION
Beyond the often asymmetrical strategic importance of incidents at sea compared 
with those on land, other factors further explain why significant escalation is 
unlikely at sea� The nature of naval combat and operations at sea reduces the 
likelihood of a sustained escalatory cycle� This, combined with the factors of time 
and distance and, frequently, the opacity of incidents at sea, has a calming influ-
ence on the wider political and strategic picture, thereby contributing to making 
de-escalation easier�
Attribution
Escalation is rendered less likely by the often-opaque nature of incidents at sea� 
The difficulty of attribution following incidents at sea, something that is magni-
fied in the case of submarine operations, reduces the escalatory potential of an 
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incident, even one as serious as the sinking of a vessel�28 Richard Smoke argues in 
his analysis of the Italian submarine campaign of 1937 that because of the anony-
mous character of submarine warfare, “[t]he immediate and direct connection to 
the responsible nation in this sense was broken, and the probability of a response 
directly against Italy reduced�”29
This argument seemingly was confirmed following the sinking of Cheonan� 
The South Korean corvette sank on March 26, 2010, yet while North Korea im-
mediately was suspected of being behind the incident, the lack of eyewitnesses 
and the difficulty of collecting evidence made the immediate authoritative attri-
bution of the attack to North Korea particularly challenging� This reduced South 
Korea’s ability to justify an immediate military response�30 It also provided time 
for Washington and, as Robert Gates suggests, Beijing to work to de-escalate 
postsinking tensions�31 Ultimately, it took almost two months for an international 
investigatory team to attribute the attack officially to a North Korean torpedo�32
The time needed to investigate incidents at sea has provided the necessary 
breathing room to de-escalate tensions in other cases as well� The 1904 Dogger 
Bank incident, in which a Russian fleet transiting from Europe to Asia acciden-
tally sank a number of British fishing vessels, demonstrates that the time needed 
to establish the facts fully allowed both governments and outside powers to ame-
liorate substantial public ire, control the military response, and reduce internal 
pressures to go to war� The incident ultimately was resolved with an apology and 
the establishment of an international investigatory commission�33
Distance and Escalation Dominance
The operational space that characterizes the sea also reduces the possibility of 
escalation� Naval and other maritime forces have the capacity to transit greater 
distances and to do so much more quickly than land forces�34 Yet the areas in 
which individual vessels and units operate often are much larger than those on 
land�35 Unless there is a specific and demarcated area of contention, such as the 
aforementioned NLL, forces at sea tend to be dispersed� Therefore, following an 
accidental or isolated clash at sea, time is required for additional forces to enter 
the area of operations� Conversely, the lack of geographical barriers allows for 
clashing vessels to separate quickly without losing control of territory, as would 
occur on land� The speed of modern naval warfare supports the case that distance 
and dispersal reduce the likelihood of escalation�
While there is little contemporary evidence of what the precise nature of naval 
warfare in a modern combat environment will be, it likely will be a rapid affair 
in which combat between vessels would be over quickly�36 This lessens the likeli-
hood that the use of force will evolve organically, as any clash would be finished 
before reinforcements could arrive�
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Once again, the sea battles on the NLL provide the best evidence to support 
this argument, as they are among the few examples of contemporary modern 
naval combat, albeit without the use of missiles� In the first battle of Yeonpyeong, 
once the North Korean vessels opened fire the engagement lasted fourteen min-
utes� The second battle of Yeonpyeong, including the arrival of proximate South 
Korean reinforcements, lasted approximately thirty minutes� The battle of Dae-
cheong lasted eight minutes�37 In each of these cases, South Korean naval forces 
quickly achieved dominance in the engagement, either sinking their North Ko-
rean opponents or forcing them into retreat before North Korean reinforcements 
could arrive� After the initial clash, the combination of South Korean superiority, 
the North Korean navy’s inability to concentrate force, and the North Koreans’ 
ability to escape resulted in clashes that ended without further escalation�
The importance of escalation dominance also was demonstrated during the 
Lobster War of 1963, when President Charles de Gaulle deployed a French naval 
destroyer to protect French fishing interests off the coast of Brazil� The Brazil-
ian navy deployed its aircraft carrier, Minas Gerais, and the French force quickly 
backed down�38 The situation de-escalated because the Brazilian forces achieved 
escalation dominance and distance prevented the French from providing rein-
forcements quickly� This speaks to the importance of the local balance of forces 
in the area of engagement, as opposed to the total capability of opposing navies� 
Even weaker powers can achieve escalation dominance if their deployed forces 
are superior� Reflecting these findings, several studies on deterrence have found 
that it is not the ratio of total capabilities but the “immediate or short-term bal-
ance of forces” in proximity to the target that has the greatest impact on deter-
rence calculations�39
The Naval and Maritime Profession
The nature of shipboard life and the technical expertise needed to operate at sea 
require a relatively high level of professionalism and minimize the number of 
individuals capable of undertaking escalatory action, in comparison with land 
forces� Command chains in most navies are more structured than they are in the 
other military services, with obedience to the commanding officer an absolute 
requirement in the rigid world of ships often operating away from port�40 The 
technical nature of naval operations also places a premium on following proce-
dures�41 In combination, these realities ensure that inadvertent escalatory action 
on the part of a crewmember is less likely (although not impossible)�
This reality also places a lot of responsibility on the senior officers of vessels� 
During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union signed the 1972 
Incidents at Sea Agreement (INCSEA)� A primary driver behind the Soviets’ 
agreeing to such a measure was the rapid expansion of their navy, which had 
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resulted in inexperienced officers being promoted� This created fears within the 
Soviet command that such inexperience could “inadvertently lead to an incident 
with grave consequences for both countries�”42
The importance of the commanding officers for avoiding or initiating escala-
tion at sea can be seen during the so-called lock-on incident between Japanese 
and Chinese vessels in 2013� Media reports suggest that it was the Chinese vessel’s 
commander himself who made the decision to lock a fire-control radar onto a Ja-
pan Maritime Self-Defense Force ship�43 Equally, the decision whether to respond 
was in the hands of the Japanese commander himself�44 In this case, restraint fol-
lowing the initial escalatory act led to de-escalation of the situation�
Expense and Pride
As states develop their navies and invest more money in them, they are less likely 
to be willing to sacrifice expensive and prestigious assets by escalating clashes in 
a nonexistential context� While warships are purchased and designed to fight, 
they represent large capital investments and are linked closely to national pride 
and achievement�45 Clashes in nonexistential environments rarely justify the loss 
of such assets�
This argument only is strengthened when navies grow in power� The costs 
of miscommunications and clashes at sea increase as more-powerful platforms 
become involved, since losing such a ship has both a high financial and a high 
political impact� As Abram N� Shulsky points out, as the Soviet navy expanded, 
its platforms increased, not only in number and power, but in monetary and ide-
ational value�46 While this provided the Soviet leadership with greater signaling 
options at sea, it also ensured that the accuracy of such signaling increased in 
importance, as both the USSR and the United States stood to lose more if opera-
tions at sea escalated�
For many smaller states, modern warships are among the most expen-
sive military assets they possess and are not easy to replace� Modern, high- 
technology warships are more powerful and their increasing multifunctionality 
means they are capable of fulfilling a wider number of roles, but their rising costs 
have reduced fleet numbers�47 This places a premium on the survival of expensive 
platforms and ensures that these vessels will be risked only if national interests 
demand it�
Agreements and Managing Escalation
Escalation through an inadvertent miscalculation or following an isolated inci-
dent can be prevented or mitigated by the establishment of agreements that both 
set the rules of interaction between maritime forces and provide mechanisms for 
the alleviation of tension�
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Internaval or intergovernmental agreements that aim to mitigate potential 
clashes at sea have proved successful� This was especially true during the Cold 
War� INCSEA provided rules for both navies on how to operate and provided 
relief mechanisms when incidents occurred� The agreement was negotiated at 
a time when incidents at sea between the two sides were becoming increasingly 
robust, including a number of collisions and near collisions� The concern was 
that, aside from the actual danger to lives and equipment that an incident at sea 
represented, there was substantial risk that an incident could cause a crisis, or 
even direct combat, to erupt�48
Importantly, both sides acknowledged that incidents at sea were an inevitable 
consequence of great-power interaction at sea, but that such incidents needed 
to be managed� As Sean Lynn-Jones points out, INCSEA accepted “the reality of 
U�S�-Soviet competition and competitive interaction� � � � [I]t implicitly assumes 
that U�S� and Soviet warships and aircraft will continue their rivalry at sea and 
engage in ‘gunboat diplomacy’ to influence political outcomes�”49
The agreement provided for an annual meeting at which violations were re-
viewed, and when required naval attachés assigned to their respective embassies 
served as liaisons� While the agreement was not perfect and clashes continued at 
sea, it was an effective release valve that reduced tensions and mitigated the risk 
of miscalculation�
The effectiveness of this agreement was predicated on the reality that neither 
side wanted to escalate tensions inadvertently and damage valuable government 
assets� This resulted in both the United States and the Soviet Union actively seek-
ing to improve INCSEA and engaging with each other via its processes�50 This 
suggests that for an agreement to have utility, both sides must view it as benefi-
cial� Professional understanding between naval officers of the two sides also was 
a key component in ensuring the success of INCSEA�51 Professional empathy 
created by consistent working-level interactions between officers of conflicting 
sides cannot eliminate the possibility of inadvertent escalation but can reduce it� 
Another successful component was the agreement’s relative obscurity; keeping 
it out of the public eye allowed both navies to administer the agreement with 
minimal political interference�52
Beyond formal agreements such as INCSEA, open channels of communica-
tion also are viable methods of reducing tension� Establishing hotlines between 
governments, ministries of defense, and military services can reduce the risk of 
misunderstandings and aid in coordinating de-escalatory measures� However, as 
with operational agreements, hotlines are not a panacea, nor do they guarantee 
peace� Rather, their primary utility, as was demonstrated during the Cold War, is 
as a crisis-management tool�53
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ESCALATION IN EAST ASIAN WATERS
This section asks whether the dampening effect that a maritime strategic en-
vironment has on escalation applies to the current situation in East Asia� This 
theater presents a complex array of challenges, with maritime boundary disputes 
interacting with the wider issues that have developed because of China’s rise and 
the increasing sophistication of its maritime strategy�
Currently, the nature of interactions at sea in East Asia conforms to the con-
struct outlined above� Boundary and strategic disputes in the region have created 
a maritime environment in which instability is a prominent feature, yet escalatory 
acts, though frequent, have remained limited in nature and so far have not cre-
ated an escalatory spiral or resulted in the outbreak of sustained violence�
Maritime Disputes
China’s 2015 defense white paper, China’s Military Strategy, calls for the “tradi-
tional mentality that land outweighs sea” to be abandoned and for China to de-
velop into a maritime power�54 This white paper documents China’s progressive 
emphasis on sea power, both to protect its regional interests and to support its 
growing number of overseas strategic priorities�55 Such an approach is designed 
to further China’s vision of a new maritime status quo for the region, one in 
which China has broad economic exploitation rights beyond those that UNCLOS 
grants and in which China maintains a position of geostrategic preeminence�56
China’s approach has been to legitimize its maritime claims in East Asia 
through the use of domestic law, obstruct other littoral nations from exploiting 
their own resources, and facilitate the operations of Chinese state and nonstate 
economic actors in the region�57 The coercive actions of these state and civilian 
actors in carrying out Beijing’s vision have led to several incidents and clashes, 
which have resulted in sustained low-level instability but no significant escalation�
Disputes over resource exploitation arising from contested maritime boundar-
ies also have occurred among other claimant states in the South China Sea� The 
naval and maritime law-enforcement forces of Taiwan, the Philippines, Indone-
sia, Malaysia, and Vietnam all have clashed at sea� These disputes have resulted in 
standoffs, gunfire, and spectacular water fights at sea between rival sets of coast 
guard and civilian actors� However, as with the incidents involving China direct-
ly, they have not yet resulted in war, sustained escalation, or significant loss of life�
A snapshot of significant maritime incidents in the South China Sea reveals 
that, of fifteen significant clashes in 2016, twelve involved Chinese naval or coast 
guard forces�58 The level of force used included ramming, harassment, and even 
the firing of shots, but in none of the cases did escalation occur after the initial 
clash� A similar pattern prevailed in 2015, during which eight out of ten major 
incidents involved Chinese forces�59
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In the East China Sea, a comparable trend of low-level instability without 
escalation can be observed� Chinese government and private vessels consistently 
have operated in Japanese-claimed waters, particularly around the disputed 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands�60 According to the Japanese government, over a four-
year period between 2012 and 2016, each month an average of fifty-seven Chi-
nese governmental and nongovernmental vessels operated in the contiguous 
zone surrounding the disputed islands, and an average of nine vessels operated 
in the claimed territorial seas�61 These monthly averages are punctuated by occa-
sional spikes in activity; for example, in August 2016 over two hundred Chinese 
fishing vessels escorted by China Coast Guard ships entered the contiguous zone 
around the islands�62 Such contestation operations have resulted in some signifi-
cant but isolated clashes in the region, including collisions between fishing boats 
and coast guard vessels, the use of water cannon, and the previously highlighted 
lock-on incident�
Violent clashes at sea, with no further escalation, also occur in the fertile fish-
ing grounds off the coast of South Korea� Chinese fishing vessels consistently 
have performed illegal fishing activities in South Korean waters, even in the high-
ly sensitive areas around the NLL� South Korean sources suggest that between 
April and June—the height of blue crab season—over two hundred Chinese 
boats per day have fished illegally in that region�63 Such activities have resulted 
in numerous, even deadly clashes between South Korean coast guard vessels and 
Chinese fishermen� In 2011, a South Korean officer was murdered by a Chinese 
fishing captain during efforts to seize the Chinese vessel�64 In 2016, three Chinese 
fishermen were killed accidentally during boarding operations, and in a separate 
incident a small South Korean coast guard vessel was sunk after being rammed 
by a Chinese trawler�65
The United States, China, and Freedom of Navigation
While the United States is not a claimant state in the disputes in the East and 
South China Seas, it does have substantial strategic and economic interests in 
the region� China’s use of coercive pressure to enforce its claims and its island-
building activities have drawn substantial criticism from U�S� policy makers� This 
derives from both normative and strategic concerns� China presents a potential 
challenge to U�S� maritime dominance in Asia and is in dispute with many U�S� 
allies and security partners, most notably Japan� Further, the United States does 
not recognize China’s expansive claims in the region, nor does it accept China’s 
assertion that China as a coastal state can regulate foreign military activities in its 
EEZ�66 These factors have combined to create substantial but not insurmountable 
strategic tensions between Washington and Beijing�
The United States challenges China’s expansive claims in the region through its 
freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs)� This has resulted in operations at 
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sea that have brought U�S� naval vessels into proximity with Chinese civilian, para-
military, and military actors� While the United States officially views FONOPs as 
normal operations, the Chinese perceive them as potentially threatening� In 2016, 
a Chinese admiral stated that “China consistently opposes so-called military free-
dom of navigation, which brings with it a military threat and which challenges 
and disrespects the international law of the sea�”67 Despite such sentiments, to date 
the Chinese have not challenged U�S� FONOPs substantially on an operational 
level, instead preferring to engage on a political and rhetorical one�
Under the Obama administration, U�S� naval vessels conducted five widely 
reported FONOPs in the South China Sea, and at the time of this writing the U�S� 
Navy has conducted four more FONOPs since President Trump took office�68 So 
far no case of FONOPs has resulted in escalation to the use of substantial force; 
however, robust incidents have occurred� These incidents, as with clashes over 
maritime disputes, conform to the pattern of low-level instability seen in recent 
years at sea� The now-infamous 2009 incident of Chinese harassment of USNS 
Impeccable highlighted the potential for diverging views of freedom of naviga-
tion to lead to isolated clashes at sea� The general Chinese response has been to 
shadow vessels conducting such operations with naval and coast guard assets� 
Additionally, it has been reported that in the case of USS Lassen a number of 
Chinese fishing and merchant ships maneuvered around the U�S� ship as it sailed 
by the Chinese installation on Subi Reef�69 In December 2016, a Chinese vessel 
removed a U�S� underwater drone from the water within eyeshot of a U�S� naval 
vessel�70 This was a blatant obstruction of U�S� navigation rights, yet it did not 
result in an escalation to violence�
FONOPs also were carried out during the Cold War� The initial Soviet re-
sponse was diplomatic, but the Soviets felt that such FONOPs were unneces-
sarily provocative, and responses escalated to more-forcible measures, notably 
the ramming of USS Yorktown in 1988 while it was conducting a FONOP in 
the Black Sea� However, the parties found military and political solutions�71 The 
military solution prescribed further rules for interaction between vessels� The 
political solution, agreed to in 1988, saw the Soviet Union acceding to the U�S� 
interpretation of the law of the sea and the United States determining that it no 
longer needed to assert its right of freedom of navigation in the Black Sea�72 This 
was an elegant solution for both sides, in that the United States did not give up 
its right to perform FONOPs, yet it got the USSR to agree to the established laws 
of the sea, while the Soviet Union put a stop to what it perceived as destabilizing 
behavior� This suggests that political solutions to freedom of navigation issues 
can be found and that clashes over FONOPs, if they occur, can be managed once 
it is in the interests of both parties to do so�
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The Potential for Escalation
Currently, available data suggest that the trend of maritime interactions in the 
seas of East Asia is mirroring that seen during and after the Cold War� This would 
indicate that sustained low-level instability will continue to characterize the stra-
tegic picture, but that escalation is unlikely�
Significant clashes did occur in the South China Sea in 1974 and 1988� How-
ever, in both cases, Chinese and Vietnamese forces clashed over the control of 
disputed features, not as a result of operations at sea� In 1974, China wrested 
control of the Paracel Islands from Vietnamese forces, and in 1988 the militaries 
of the two countries fought as they attempted to secure Johnson South Reef in the 
Spratly Islands� While this article focuses on the potential for escalation arising 
out of clashes resulting from incidents at sea, it also is worth noting that following 
both of these cases no substantial further escalation occurred�73
However, East Asia has a unique characteristic when it comes to strategic-level 
interactions� Unlike during the Cold War and the case of the Korean Peninsula, in 
East Asia the main crucible of interaction is located at sea� China and the United 
States have no forces opposing each other on land, and with the exception of 
Taiwan there are no arenas where the United States and China could clash that 
have significant populated areas� This arguably reduces the risk of a clash at sea 
spilling over onto land; therefore, the restraining effect of devastating war that 
was operative during the Cold War may be weaker� This may allow Chinese or 
U�S� commanders the freedom to escalate a clash, given that the potential strate-
gic costs resulting therefrom would be lessened�74
However, while there is no existential threat, conflict between the United 
States and China would mean conflict between the world’s two biggest economies 
in some of the world’s most economically vital seas� This places pressure on both 
sides to manage the instability caused by conflictual interactions� As Chinese for-
eign minister Wang Yi stated in 2017, “There cannot be conflict between China 
and the United States, as both sides will lose and both sides cannot afford that�”75
Operationally, the increasing presence and prominence of civilian law-
enforcement actors such as coast guards and the role of paramilitary maritime 
militias are new phenomena� This introduces a variable that has not been seen 
previously� A clash between coast guard or militia vessels may escalate to the 
involvement of naval vessels� However, so far—despite substantial clashes at sea 
between maritime law-enforcement actors—such escalation has not occurred�76
A further issue arising from competing maritime claims in Asia is their link-
age with nationalism and history� Contested claims over the sovereign control of 
islands and operations in contested waters have provoked significant public reac-
tion in countries across the region, including China, Vietnam, and the Philippines� 
Clashes that occur at sea increasingly are portrayed on social media, and while 
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that might constrain maritime actors from acting aggressively, it also could stoke 
protests to which governments might feel the need to respond, to assuage their 
publics� Significant protests occurred in China following Japan’s nationalization of 
the Senkaku Islands and in Vietnam following China’s exploration activities near 
the Paracel Islands, but these did not result in escalatory processes and the gov-
ernments in question eventually acted to quell public displays of dissatisfaction�77 
However, it should be acknowledged that even a single future clash at sea may act 
as a trigger for nationalist sentiment, which could elevate an incident beyond its 
objective political or strategic value and result in unforeseen escalation�
As with the Cold War, tensions have produced some positive outcomes, par-
ticularly in managing interactions at sea and reducing the risk of miscalculation� 
The 2014 multinational Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) agree-
ment indicated a desire to manage interactions at sea� Similarly, the 2016 agree-
ment between China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
on CUES and ongoing negotiations over a code of conduct for the South China 
Sea should be seen as starting points to mitigate further the potential for unin-
tended escalation at sea�78
Given the concerns that the Soviet Union highlighted in the 1970s regarding 
the escalatory potential of inexperienced officers, the rapid expansion of Asian 
coast guards should be noted� The circumstances of East Asia, where coast guards 
are taking the lead in enforcing maritime claims, suggest a need for similar agree-
ments within this context� Such agreements should be tailored to the specific 
roles that coast guards undertake�79 As with naval agreements during the Cold 
War, for such agreements to be successful it is vital that all sides perceive their 
operational and political benefits�
Hotlines also are present in Northeast Asia, most notably between the military 
services of South Korea and Japan and those of South Korea and China�80 There 
also are moves toward a working-level hotline between China and ASEAN� Fur-
ther, there is a South Korea–China coast guard hotline, which soon could be rep-
licated between China and the Philippines�81 However, hotlines are effective only 
when both sides agree to use them� There is some evidence that in times of crisis 
China has not used hotlines effectively� In January 2017, a fleet of Chinese mili-
tary aircraft entered the South Korean air-defense identification zone� Reports 
suggest that the Chinese did not answer the hotline when South Korean officials 
attempted to contact them to clarify the fleet’s intentions� Nevertheless, Japan 
and China also are in the process of agreeing on a communication mechanism to 
de-escalate unintended incidents in the East China Sea�82
This analysis suggests that the fear that escalation will result from an incident 
at sea is, by and large, overemphasized� Clashes in areas of strategic tension or 
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contested maritime boundaries are to be expected; however, there is little evi-
dence that such clashes lead to escalatory cycles or sustained violence�
This absence of escalatory behavior can be attributed to several factors that 
maritime strategic geography imposes� Historically, the strategic or political ben-
efits of escalation at sea rarely have outweighed the potential costs� The bottom 
line is that what happens at sea rarely materially affects populations on land, and 
therefore a costly war over maritime issues is less likely to occur�
De-escalation after an incident is facilitated by the fact that the sea cannot 
be controlled permanently, so the costs of withdrawal are reduced, as such a 
move does not result automatically in the loss of territory� Further, the size of the 
maritime environment, coupled with the speed of clashes at sea, allows for easier 
de-escalation, as time is needed to concentrate often-dispersed maritime forces� 
Organic escalation therefore is less likely to occur, since political and military 
elites would be required to commit expensive assets intentionally to continue a 
clash� Equally, information gathering also is hindered by the nature of operations 
at sea� Time often is required to ascertain facts fully, and this gap allows for politi-
cal and strategic tensions to cool�
It would be wrong to suggest that it is impossible for an outbreak of sustained 
violence at sea in Asia to occur� Decision makers could choose to escalate fol-
lowing a clash at sea, or they might feel they had no other option� Further, the 
geostrategic situation in East Asia, where the stakes are not existential, may in-
crease the risk of one side seeing a strategic or political benefit from escalating 
such a clash deliberately� However, to date, incidents at sea in the region have not 
resulted in substantial escalation; instead, they have conformed to the patterns 
outlined in this analysis�
More attention should be paid to differences arising from geostrategic compe-
tition occurring at sea rather than on land� It is important for all parties to realize 
and accept that, in the conditions currently present in Asia, clashes at sea are nor-
mal� The keys to maintaining stability in these conditions of sustained low-level 
instability are crisis management and the ability to cope with the initial clashes 
that inevitably will occur when strategic and territorial interests collide at sea�
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